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Abstract 
Some strands of feminist and social philosophy suggest that the basis for personhood is having an 
identity—where identity is not defined entirely in individualistic terms of reason and autonomy 
and is in fact quite relational. When personhood is conceived in these terms, morality becomes a 
matter of recognizing persons for who they are, which includes recognizing them as members of 
social groups. In this paper I explore the notion of esteem as a species of recognition for these 
layers of identity, claiming that esteem deserves to stand on equal footing with respect as a moral 
attitude. 
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For better or worse, the categories we apply to ourselves and one another matter. They 
matter to who we are as individuals, and to how we relate to others who are similar to or 
different from us. You can be an indigenous person, a cisgender person, a middle-class 
atheist with autism, or all of these. You can be a Star Trek fan, a Lego master builder, a 
father of twins, or, again, all of these. Categories can be used to define an individual’s 
identity, cultivate solidarity with others, and enforce and perpetuate oppressive social 
boundaries. 
But traditional moral thinking has concentrated on personhood in the abstract—a 
particularly individualistic conception of personhood that backgrounds such categories. In 
the analytic tradition, morality has for some time been construed as a matter of treating 
other persons with respect based on their capacity for autonomy, which is thought of as 
grounded in reason. One reason for this is Kant’s conviction that morality is universal 
together with the belief that reason is also universal, both in the sense that it is the same 
for all and that it is what all persons have in common. This conception of both morality and 
personhood has many advantages, but it deemphasizes things like categories and 
individuality that also matter to us, thus causing a longstanding “blind spot” in 
philosophical thought about morality. 
In recent decades, feminists and social philosophers have called attention to this blind spot 
by highlighting the experiences of subordinated groups and mining them for insight about 
moral experience. Some strands of this thinking suggest that what is universal about 
humans, and hence the basis for their personhood, is their having an identity—where 
identity is not defined entirely in terms of reason and autonomy (as traditionally 
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understood) and is in fact quite relational.1 When personhood is conceived in these terms, 
morality becomes a matter of recognizing persons for who they are, where “who they are” 
is a layered thing: people are persons in the abstract, where this is more a matter of what 
rather than who they are; people are concrete individuals with a unique combination of 
personal characteristics, relationships, interests, and so on; they are also members of any 
number of intersecting categories that form layers between the very abstract and very 
concrete.  
The moral attitude of respect that has garnered so much of analytic philosophy’s attention 
is a form of recognition2 whose object is personhood in the abstract3 (even when we take 
personhood in the broader, relational sense). Love, whose philosophical profile has been 
rising in recent years, is a form of recognition whose object is individuality.4 Is there, then, 
a distinct recognitional attitude (or set of attitudes) whose object is those middle, category-
based layers of identity? I believe there is, and in this paper I want to explore this attitude 
and its the moral importance. My claim will be that esteem, as I will call it, deserves to 
stand on equal footing with respect as a moral attitude; like respect and love it is a crucial 
nexus of moral recognition. 
In The Struggle for Recognition (1996), Axel Honneth divides moral recognition into three 
major categories that roughly correspond to those I laid out above: rights, which provide 
what he calls “cognitive support” to someone as a moral agent; love, which provides 
emotional support to someone as an individual with specific needs; and solidarity, which 
provides social esteem to someone whose traits and abilities make them a member of a 
“community of value” (ch. 5). I’m probably drawing the lines somewhat differently from 
Honneth, but his treatment of the idea of solidarity works as a starting point. 
Honneth characterizes esteem according to its function of allowing individuals to achieve a 
healthy relation-to-self in virtue of being recognized for their “concrete traits and abilities” 
(121). At this level, we are singling people out according to difference, rather than 
universals, but the differences are generalized and intersubjective, so that we view people 
as members of groups who share some characteristic—hence we are somewhere between 
abstract personhood and concrete individuality. And we have worth in the form of social 
status as instances of these (intersecting) types (123). Deriving worth from group identity 
in this way requires a set of shared values against which an individual’s contribution to a 
group can be understood (121). Honneth’s idea is that when we see ourselves as members 
of socially valuable groups—which, because they share some valued characteristic, are 
communities of value—we take on a kind of solidarity with fellow group members. When 
 
1 See, for example, Lindemann (2014), Held (2006), Kittay (2010). 
2 Throughout this paper, I am using “recognition” in a positive, valuing sense. The term can also be used in a 
neutral, taking-into-account sense: I can recognize someone as a threat, or recognize someone’s needs, in 
order to generate an appropriate response. Thus, I can recognize a white supremacist in the neutral sense 
without recognizing them in the positive sense. 
3 See, for example, Darwall (1977), Buss (1999), Honneth (1996). 
4 See, for example, Helm (2010), Fitz-Gibbon (2012), Honneth (1996). 
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this social esteem is internalized, it manifests as self-esteem, that is, confidence that other 
individuals will recognize you as an individual (128-9).  
There’s quite a bit to unpack here. I’ll start with the idea that esteem is based on personal 
traits and abilities. Lots of things fall under “traits and abilities,” and they are not all alike 
when it comes to how they contribute to someone’s identity, so it’s worth teasing them 
apart if we’re going to understand how to accord them proper recognition. There are social 
group traits like race, gender, class, etc.; talents; virtues; interests; and personal 
characteristics like sense of humor, mannerisms, taste, etc. All of these are influenced by 
historical and cultural circumstances. The boundaries between them are sometimes blurry, 
but broadly speaking, these different classes of traits function differently at the social level 
and both evoke and call for different kinds of (moral) response. 
Characteristics like race, gender, class, and so on, have wide “external” or “top down” social 
implications in the sense that they shape how others perceive us, are more given to us, and 
are not things we have to work at. They are what are referred to as social identities, and the 
way these identities are valued or disvalued by individuals—both inside and outside a 
group—is heavily influenced by the social construction of the meaning of these categories. 
Social identity in this sense is accorded to people in virtue of their having (or being 
perceived to have) the trait that is characteristic of the group (e.g. skin color, gender 
markers, noticeable disability, etc.).  
Talents are another kind of “trait or ability,” and they are also thought of as more given, but 
they’re considered more individual than social identities, and they require cultivation in 
order to gain social recognition. You might have a talent for music or mathematics the way 
you have a race or ethnicity, but unlike the latter, the former isn’t going to characterize you 
unless you work to hone it. But when their talents are cultivated and circumstances 
favorable, talented people can identify with their accomplishments and achieve great social 
status. 
Virtues, like talents, require cultivation, but they’re different from talents in that the 
capacity for virtue is thought of as something everyone is born with—though which virtues 
are cultivated, and even what counts as a virtue, is socially conditioned. But here too, 
conditions must be favorable for virtues to be cultivated. Virtue is easier to achieve in 
environments with good teachers and role models, and where circumstances allow for 
healthy development. When it’s achieved, however, people can name their virtues as part of 
who they are; they might think of themselves as brave, caring, spirited, etc. 
Interests are more choice-based than other traits named so far, since we can change them 
more readily than other characteristics, though they too are constrained by historical and 
cultural circumstances. An notable thing about interests, however, is that the social groups 
formed on their basis seem more “internal” or “bottom up” than social groups based on 
traits like race or gender. Bird lovers aren’t immediately identifiable by their appearance, 
so they have to choose moves like joining the local Audubon Society chapter in order to 
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cultivate the social opportunities that identity affords—unlike more perceptible traits like 
race or gender that immediately put us into one box or another.  
A final identity maker worth mentioning here is work. Honneth seems to take work as a 
paradigm instance of a basis for social esteem. The work we do does have a tremendous 
influence on our sense of self and self-worth, as well as social position, but it does not fit 
cleanly into any of the classes I’ve discussed. Because of the social status associated with 
different types of work, it has much in common with the characteristics that contribute to 
social identity. But in many (though certainly not all) cases, there are elements of talent, 
choice, and interest that make work overlap with the other classes. Thus, I suggest it is a 
separate class of trait from any of the others I’ve named. 
With this taxonomy of traits in mind, I suggest that the way we afford recognition to these 
different classes of identity makers falls into two rough categories, which is to say I think 
esteem can be divided into two subcategories. Consider first the attitudes we have toward 
people with excellences like virtue and talent. Darwall (1977) calls our recognition of these 
traits “appraisal respect,” a species of admiration for the people in virtue of these 
excellences. In Western culture, appraisal respect seems to accrue to people as 
individuals—we don’t think of them in terms of membership in a group of, say, virtuoso 
pianists or kind people, and (as far as I know) there aren’t gatherings like patience 
conventions in which people bond as patient people. Virtuoso pianists do gather, as they do 
for competitions, but the focus in a competition is on individuals’ talent more than it is on 
bonding over their talent and accomplishment. Despite its accruing to people as 
individuals, however, appraisal respect is a form of esteem rather than love because our 
recognition of an excellence targets only one aspect of a person, not their individuality as a 
whole.  
Next consider the kind of recognition afforded to people on the basis of social identities, 
interests, and work. This accrues to people as members of some group: Muslim, Lakota, 
transgendered, pickers at Amazon, lawyers, Game of Thrones fans, model airplane 
enthusiasts, etc. This gets more complex because while these categories are all things that 
people can identify with and bond over, the defining group characteristic may have more or 
less social significance. Although it may signal many things about you, being a Game of 
Thrones fan doesn’t influence your standing in society the way being a Muslim or a picker 
at Amazon does. Nevertheless, to the extent that membership in a group is important to 
your sense of yourself, it’s frequently important that you be recognized—esteemed—for 
this membership. For lack of a better term (though I would welcome one), I’ll label this type 
of esteem “recognition-as.” When a group membership is important to us (in a certain 
context), we want to be recognized as members of this group.  
Recognition-as may itself have some sub-species. Honneth discusses solidarity in 
connection with this kind of group identity, and solidarity is important. It’s an internal sort 
of recognition-as: a way for members of a group to value their group as such and one 
another as members of the group. When the group is a subordinated one, solidarity can 
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help members to cultivate individual and group pride (Honneth 128); group members 
bond together actively to strengthen group identity and work to promote their interests as 
a group. Solidarity is outward-facing in that it is a way of standing up for and owning a 
group identity. Solidarity may also be adopted by people who are not members of the 
group but who value the group because of similar interests or as a matter of justice: 
unionized members of one profession may join another union’s strike as a show of 
solidarity. But this kind of external solidarity can be tricky and is not always welcome by 
the members of the group.  
Related to solidarity is fraternity. Anthony Cunningham describes fraternity as a bond 
between people based on some shared experience with which they identify (1991, 127). 
For Cunningham, the core concept is the sharing of commitments in a way that helps group 
members identify with one another. This doesn’t mean universal harmony, but it is a bond 
that goes beyond convenience or feeling--something like the idea that “blood is thicker than 
water.” “Fraternal bonds,” Cunningham suggests, “require a sense of sharing that can lead 
to a transcendence or expansion of the self to include others in a personal, even if non-
intimate way” (127). Fraternity in this sense involves “a receptivity to sharing one’s life in a 
way that gives rise to a shared care and concern for others”--as others in a specific group or 
relationship (127). It is more inward-facing than solidarity, then, in its emphasis on 
whatever experience or characteristic is shared within the group. 
But because they are primarily—though perhaps not exclusively—bonds shared within a 
group, solidarity and fraternity are unable to include how outsiders may recognize and 
value people within the group. That is, they don’t fully capture allyship or other forms of 
outsiders’ esteem. Part of what solidarity aims at in its outward-facing capacity is 
recognition from outsiders of the value of the group as such, and the value of the people in 
the group as members of that group—examples include gay pride and Black Lives Matter. 
Thus, we need this third term to capture the kind of “external” recognition-as that isn’t fully 
captured by solidarity and fraternity. 
So far, then, I have sorted social esteem into different kinds: appraisal respect for traits like 
talent and virtue, and recognition-as for traits that form the basis of social identities—
which can take the form of solidarity or fraternity, or a more external, perhaps “plain old,” 
recognition-as. The taxonomy is nice, but so what? Well, part of the point is that 
recognition, as moral valuing, can take many forms; respect isn’t the only form that matters 
morally, and we may owe one another more than just the “recognition respect” (Darwall 
1977) we can have toward others as (abstract) persons.  
One reason for this is that we never interact with people on the level of abstract 
personhood. Rightly or wrongly, we immediately form impressions of them using the social 
categories we infer they belong to from contextual clues. Another reason is that lack of 
esteem makes it much harder to respect others as persons. Implicit bias suggests as much. 
Thus, because group identity interacts with recognition as a person, one way to resist 
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implicit bias is to work on esteem for subordinated identities. A better understanding of 
esteem can help with this. 
Group identity also interacts with recognition as an individual. Love sees past categories in 
some respects; the idea that love is “blind” suggests that lovers look past certain traits of 
their beloved. But for a genuine, healthy love, this “looking past” can’t be a matter of 
ignoring these traits or thinking they don’t matter—because insofar as the categories the 
beloved inhabits form part of their identity, they do matter. They just don’t matter in the 
sense of making a difference to how the lover values the beloved. (Incidentally, because 
love values the beloved for who they are, loving people in certain categories should tend to 
raise the lovers’ esteem of those categories. We know that getting to know individual 
“Others” tends to soften attitudes toward their Otherness.) 
But esteem is also important in its own right, even in contexts less intimate than love. We 
need people who are like us for a sense of belonging, and we need people who are different 
to value us—not just despite but because of our differences—for a sense of social ease. As 
Honneth notes, social esteem is an important source of identity formation and self-esteem. 
We need others to become ourselves. This is partly because of the reciprocal way 
recognition works. One great insight of recognition theory, generally attributed to Fichte, is 
that recognizing someone as having an identity helps to constitute that very identity 
whenever you recognize me as someone whose recognition matters (Laitinen (2010) calls 
this the “mutuality insight” of recognition theory). My seeing who you are (in an affirming 
way) helps you be who you are because you can be more comfortable in your own skin, 
which is a much better state to be in than when you must hide or downplay a part of 
yourself.  
Furthermore, if you matter, period, then you also matter as all the things that make you 
who you are, and anyone seeking to get things right needs to give adequate regard to these 
qualities (this is what Laitinen (2010) calls the “adequate regard” insight). So if respect for 
persons-as-such is morally required of us, as it is generally acknowledged to be, then 
esteem of them is too. 
Now, there’s a lot more to work out here: What about identities that are morally bad, like 
white supremacy, that we may need to take into account but not legitimize? Does this social 
esteem actually just boil down to respect in the end? Does appraisal respect really belong 
in the class of recognition I’m trying to get at here—does it really matter morally in the way 
recognition-as does? I cannot answer these questions here because I’m conveniently up 
against my word limit, but as I work out a fuller account of esteem and its moral 
importance, I hope to offer satisfying answers. 
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